Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1964

Harvey Thompson v. Ford Motor Company :
Respondent's Supplemental Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Christensen & Jensen; Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent;
Barton & Klemm; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., No. 10024 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4443

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREM.E CQU,RT

I

---· ------:- :---\--s-~-:~--~~;.~-~--r_: '"'",·:·,
Plaintiff-.Appellant,- · _.. ·

Mo~ToR

!
,J .

c-..

_i

Case No. 10024

-vs.F'ORD·

.... --•••....., ,.,_

.c·oMPANY,

I

Defendant-Respondent

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third
District Court for S-alt Lake County
Honorable Merrill c·. F·aux, Judge
CHRIS T·E,NSE·N & JE:NSE·N
1'205 Continental Bank Building
Salt [L,ake City, Utah
1

.Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
BARTON & KLEMM

304 El Paso Natl. Gas Co. Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff-.Appellant
~·fU

M

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX

Page
STATEMEN'T O·F KIND 0 F OASE__________________________________________

1

DI1SPOSITI'ON IN LOWER OO·URT ----------------------------------------

1

RELIEF SOUGH'T O·N APPEAL ----------------------------------------------

2

THE F .NCT'S ---------·--------- -----------------------------------------------------------------

2

1

ARGUMENT --------------------------------------------------------------------·--------------- 10
POINT I. THI1S IS A PRO·PER CASE FO·R SUMMARY
JU.D GMENT. ___________ ----------------------------------------------------------------- 10
POINT II. PLAINTIFF VIO·LATE·D THE STATUTORY S'TANDARD OF CARE, AND WAS THEREFORE GUILT·Y OF CONTRIBU'T'O·R.Y NEGLIGENCE
AS A MAT,TER O·F LAW. ---------------------------------------------------- 10
A.

PLAINTIF·F VIODATED SE1CTION 41-6-105, U.
C. A., 1953 __________________________________________ ------------ ________ _____ ____ _ 10

B.

VIOLATIOIN OF SECTION 41-6-105, U.C.A. 1953,
]S NEGLIGENCE AS A MAT'TER ·O'F LAW. __________ 15

C.

PLAIN'T'IFF'S NEGLIGENCE IN VIOLATING
THE STATUTORY IMPOSED DUTY O·F DUE
CARE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF T'HE
AOCID·E NT. -- _-- _____ -------- ___ ____ __ ___ ____ __ ______ _______ ____ ___ __ ___ __ ____ _ 17

CO NCLUi8I ON _-------------------- _______ ------------- ______________________ . __________ ___ ___ 17
SE·CTIONS CITED
Section 41-6-105, U.·C.A. 1953 ----------------------------------------------------11-13
Section 41-6-17 4, U .C.A. 1953 ---------------------------------------------------- 14
Section 68-3-2, U :C.'A. 1953 ---------------------------------------------------------- 12
TEXT'S CIT:ED
7 Am. Jur. 2d 795, Automobile and Highway Traffic, § 234 ____ 13
8 Am. Jur. 2d 393 ------------------------····-----------·------·-·---------------------···· 16
50 Am. Jur., Statutes, § 223 ... ·-----····-·----·----------------------------·········--· 12
50 Am. Jur., Statutes, § 225·----------·----------------------·······----------····· 11
50 Am. Jur., Statutes, §§ 303 and 305 ------------------------------------------ 13
50 Am. Jur., 315, Statutes, § ·323·----------------------------------------------- 14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASES CITED
Board of Ed. v. Bryner, 57 Ut. 78, 192 P. 627 ____________________________ 12
Hochschild, Kohn & Co., Inc. v. Candles, ( Md.), 66 A. 2d 700__ 14
North v. Cartwright, 119 Ut. 516, 229 P.2d 871. ___________________ 13-16
Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77 N.E. 2d 537 ____________ 13
Price v. Tuttle, 70 Ut. 156, 258 P. 1016 ____________________________________ 12
Robinson v. U.P.R.R. Co., 70 Ut. 441, 261 P. 9 ________________________ 12
Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 ________________________________________________________ 13
Skerl v. Willow ·Creek Coal Co., 92 Ut. 474, 69 P.2d 502 ________ 15-16
Smith v. Mine & Smelter ·Supply Co., 3'2 Utah 21, 88 P. 683 ____ 15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE· SUPREM.E CQU,RT
of the
STATE OF U'TAH
HAR\TEY TH011:PSON,
Plaintiff -Appellant,

-vs.-

FORD

~10TOR

Case No. 10024

c·OMPANY,

Defendant-Respondent

RE.SPONDENT'S S·UPP·LEMENTAL BRIEF
S.TAT·E.MENT OF KIND OF CASE
·This is a suit by plaintiff for personal injuries sustained by him in attempting to stop a garbage truck
which was rolling down a steep grade, allegedly as a
result of the failure of the parking brake.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER CO,URT
The trial judge granted a sumrnary judgment in
favor of defendant Ford Motor Cornpany and against
the plaintiff, no cause of action, on the grounds that it
appeared from plaintiff's own testimony that he was
guilty of contributory negligence as a rnatter of law in
violating Section 41-6-105, U.C.A. 1953.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

RE.LIEF SOUGH·T ON APPE:AL
Defendant-respondent seeks an affirn1ance of the
judgment below.

This is the second time that this case has been before the court. On the original appeal, Case No. 9807, a
summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent
Ford Motor c·ompany was reversed for the reason that
depositions, relied upon by defendant to support the
order granting the summary judgment, had not been
opened or published. ~This court specifically refrained
from considering or ruling upon the merits of the case.
Following remittitur to the District Court, an order
was made opening and publishing all depositions which
had been taken in the case. (R. 9). Subsequently defendant filed a renewal of its motion for summary judgment,
which was argued before Judge F:aux, and after being
taken under advisement was again granted. (R. 10, 1112). The parties have stipulated that the briefs served
and filed in case No. 9807 may be refiled in support of
their respective positions in the present case, since the
issues are identical. ·The parties have further stipulated,
and this court has ordered, that either side may file
supplemental briefs in order to present to the court any
new material which 1nay be helpful in assisting the court
to a detern1ination of the issues.
N0 .

In view of the caveat contained in the opinion in case
9807, we felt that it would be advisable, and of as sis-
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tance to the court, to elaborate upon the facts, which are
entirely without dispute, upon which Judge Faux relied
in making his ruling.
Plaintiff had had eight years experience working
in the Street Department as a garbage collector. He was
familiar with the use of garbage trucks, and with the
use of air brakes. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 3). He had
worked "the avenues" for a long time before the date of
the accident. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 4). According
to his fello\v worker Jensen, plaintiff and Jensen had
worked for five to six years together on "the avenues."
(Jensen's deposiiton, p. 18). The hill where the accident
occurred "\Vas "a pretty steep hill." (Jensen's deposition,
p. 18).
There was nothing strange or unusual about the
operation of this truck. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 2!6·).
Plaintiff had had previous experience with this type of
equipment. (Plaintiff's deposition, pp. 40, 44).
Both plaintiff and his co-"\vorker, Jensen, were fully
familiar with the dangers of a runaway on a steep hill.
Both had had that experience, and the possibility was a
source of conversation and kidding among the garbage
collectors. (Plaintiff's desposition, p ..37; Jensen's deposition, pp. 8-9').
According to plaintiff's own testimony, the truck was
stopped eight feet from the curb, pointed in a southwesterly direction. (Plaintiff's deposition, pp. 10, 23).
(See also Jensen's deposition, p. 11). Plaintiff's own
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version of the accident is set forth in following excerpts
from his testimony.
"Q. Now, were you in the middle of the
street or on the right-hand side or left-hand side o?
A.

We was on the left-hand side.

Q. What way were the wheels pointed, if you
know~

A.

Kind of an angle like this. (Indicating)

Q.

1

The street goes straight south, does it

not~

A. Straight south, and I was kind of parked
on an angle like this. (Indicating)

Q. Now, you are showing me your wheels
were turned somewhat toward the southwest?
A.

Well, yes, a little.

Q. Was the truck pointing right up and
down the street or was it angled a little toward the
southwest?
A. It was angled." (Emphasis ours.) (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 10).
"Q. Now, tell us what you did first after you
got out of the truck; where did you walk~
A.

To the back.

Q. Now, you didn't walk over to the curb to
get some garbage~
A. Well, I "\\ras aganist the curb, I walked
between the curb and the truck.
Q. And did you pick up a garbage can·J?
A.

Yes.
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Q. Did you get a chance to empty it~
A.

Yes.

Q.

Then what did you

do~

A. When we was debating on which way to
go, whether we went east or went west.

Q. You and your

partner~

A. Yes.

Q. And you were standing there talking for
a minute about that~
A. Yes, and some conversation about how
the truck worked.

Q. Where was the demonstrator at that
time, the man demonstrating it~
A. He was standing, I think, between I and
Jimmy. Jimmy was standing on the one side and
I was standing on the other.
Q. How long did you say you stood there and
talked~

A. Oh, from three to five minutes." (Plaintiff's deposition p. 11).
"Q.

that

Had you emptied all the garbage for

stop~

A. Yes.

Q.

Then what

happened~

A. Then I turned around to set two garbage
cans down and someone said the truck was moving, and that was it.

Q. And what did you
A.

do~

I just autoinatically took off.
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truck~

Q.

Took after the

A.

Yes.

Q.

And tell us then what

happened~

A. Well, I jumped on the running board
about the time it hit the curb and then the door
hit me in the back of the head and knocked me off.

*

* •

Q.

What were you hanging

A.

The steering wheel.

onto~

Q. Did you ever get a chance to get into the
seat of the cab?

A.

No.

Q.

Were you trying to reach in to any of
the controls before you got knocked off~

A. That's what I \vas trying to do, to get
into where I could control the truck.

Q.

But you weren't able to do

that~

A. I wasn't able to do it." (Emphasis ours.)
(Plaintiff's deposition, p. 12).
"Q.

And the truck was gaining speed all this

time~

A.

It had to be if it was running down hill.

Q.

Well, do you have a n1e1nory of it gaining

speed~

A. Yes." (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 13).

"Q. NO\\'", before the truck started to roll and
before you reached the cab, ho\v far had the truck
rolled~

T·HE WITNESS : I don't know.
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Q. (By Mr. Bayle) Do you have any estimate1
A. I could guess.

Q. All right, let's have that.
A.

I'd say from 60 to 80 feet.

Q. And what were you doing during that
time?
A. During the time the truck was rolling?
Q. Yes.
A.

I was after it.

Q. And which side were you
A.

on~

On the left side.

Q. Were you running?
A.

Yes.

Q. What path did the truck take before it
reached the curb~
A.

On an angle straight across the road.

Q.

To the

southwest~

A. On an angle like this. (Indicating)'' (Emphasis ours.) Plaintiff's deposition, PlJ 32-33).
"Q.
A.

And did you see the truck start to roll?
No) I didn)t.

Q. Which way were you looking at that
time~

A. I'd dumped the garbage can aud turned
around facing away from the back end of that
truck and put the two garbage can::; down and just
about got turned around when so1neone says, '·The
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truck's moving.'"
deposition, p. 34).

(Emphasi~

ours.) (Plaintiff's

"Q. And do I understand that your only concern about securing the truck is to set the brakes?
A.

Make sure it's set.

Q. That's the only precaution you take, is
that right?

A. Well, that is the only precaution you take
that I know of.
Q. And there aren't any published rules
about that in your departments, as far as you
know~

A. As far as I know." (Emphasis ours.)
(Plaintiff's deposition, p. 42).
"Q. Mr. Thompson, were you running as
hard as you can run by the time you caught up
with the truck that day~
A. Well, I'd say I was giving it all I had.
Q. And you think the truck had gone about
sixty to eighty feet before you could catch it~
A. That's just a guess." (Emphasis ours.)
(Plaintiff's deposition, p. 47).
The testimony of Jensen \vas in full accord:
"Q. Did Thompson have to run as fast as he
could to catch it?
A.

Yes.

Q. Was he going full speed when he jumped
on the truck?
A. Yes, he \vas pretty well going at it."
(1£n1phasis ours.) (Jensen's deposition, p. 13).
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"Q.

It happened to be on the east curb, is that

right~

A.

Yes.

Q. And the wheels were turned to the west?
A. To the southwest. The truck was actually facing south and the rear wheels were cramped
to the southwest so he could make the turn over
west to pick that other can up on the other side,
because it's too far to carry the cans from one
side to the other on that one particular place
there." (Emphasis ours.) (Jensen's deposition,
p. 15).
"Q. If you had been in ~fr. Thompson's position there in reference to the truck when it started
off, would you have run after it~

A. Probably would have, yes, just like I did
the other one. We have always joked and kidded
and this and that that we would never try to stop
a truck, but that's just a joke and kid there.

Q. You have joked and kidded that you'd
never stop a truck~
A. Yes. The way we figure it, if we ever do
that, we would think more about the other people,
what the truck is going to do and the damage, and
a lot of other guys have had the same trouble) but
they've caught it and stopped it in time to save
the accident.

Q. Does this often happen among the other
drivers?
Oh) once in a while) yes.
Q. And haven't you had any instruction~
about leaving a man in the cab \vhih~ you arP on a
steep hill?
A.
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A. Well, that's why we try to get a third
man on our routes like that on the hills.
Q. Yes. That morning they didn't have a
third man becaus~ there wasn't enough to go
around." (Emphasis ours.) (Jensen's deposition,
p. 17).
It was upon the foregoing testimony that
Judge Faux based his ruling. There was no evidence to the contrary. Plaintiff, of course, is
bound by his own testimony.
ARGUMENT
POIN'T I.
THI1S IS A PR:OPER CASE FOR A SUMMARY JUDG·
MENT.

We have nothing to add to the argument advanced
under Point I of our brief in Case No. 9807, and we
merely reaffirm and readopt it as part of this brief.
POIN'T II.
PLAINTIFF VIOLATED THE STATUTO·RY STANDARD
OF ·CARE, AND WAS THEREFORE GUILTY OF CONTRIBU·ToRY NEGLIGENCE AS A MA'TTER OF LAW.
A.

PLAINTIF'F VIO,LATED SECTION 41-6-105, U.C.A.,
1953.

By way of supplement to the argument under Point
IT of our brief in case No. 9807, we wish to point out the
following:
This case resolves itself into a problem of statutory
eonstruction. 'There is no dispute as to \Yhat occurred.
:B-,or purposes of the n1otion for summ-ary judgment,
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plaintiff's testimony is accepted as true. The only issue
before the court for determination is whether such conduct was contributory negligence as a matter of law
under the aforesaid statute.
It is elementary that a "statute is not open to construction as a matter of course. It is open to construction only where the language used in the statute requires
interpretation, that is, where the statute is ambiguous,
or will bear two or more constructions, or is of such
doubtful or obscure meaning, that reasonable minds
might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning." If
there is no ambiguity "it is the established policy of
the courts to regard the statute as meaning what it
says, and to avoid giving it any other construction than
that which its words demand. A plain and unambiguous
statute is to be applied and not interpreted, since such
a statute speaks for itself, and any attempt to 1nake it
clearer is a vain labor and tends only to obscurity." 50
Am. Jur., Statutes, ~225.
The language of Section 41-6-105, U.C.A. 19'53, is
clear, and, except for one phrase, hardly open to construction. Under the facts of this case, there can be no
doubt that plaintiff was a "person driving or in charge
of a motor vehicle." There is no doubt that he left the
driver's seat, and got out of the vehicle and went to the
rear thereof, for the purpose of loading so1ne garbage.
There is no doubt that he did this "without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, and re1noving the
key." ·There is no doubt that the truck was "standing
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upon" a "perceptible grade," and there is no doubt
that the front wheels thereof, were not turned to the curb
or side of the highway, but on the contrary were turned
away from the curb. For the purpose of this motion,
it may be assumed that the parking brake was effectively set and that it failed, permitting the truck to go
down hill. The only phrase which appears to be open
to construction, and the meaning of which must be
ultimately determined by this court, is the phrase "stand
unattended." ·There can be no doubt that effect must
be given to these words, and they must be given "a
consistent reasonable meaning." Robinson v. U.P.R.R.
Co., 70 Ut. 441, 261 P.9; Board of Ed. v. Bryner, 57
Ut. 78, 192 P. 6.27.
The cardinal question in statutory construction, is
determining the legislative will or intent. Once the legislative intention has been determined, it should be carried into effect to the fullest degree. 50 Am. J ur., Statutes, ~223; Sec. 68-3-2, U.C.A. 1953.
As said by this court in the c~se of Price v. Tuttle,
70 U. 156, 258 P. 1016 :
"In the construction of statutes it is the duty
of the courts to ascertain the intent of the legislative body and, if the legislation is within the
constitutional power of the Legislature, to enforce
that intent. In determining the intent of legislation, not only the language of the act may be
considered, but the purpose or objects sought by
the legislature should be and are considered by
the courts in determining the Legislative intent."
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The purpose for \vhich a statute is enacted, is of
pri1nary importance in determining the legislative intent.
In the construction of a doubtful statute it is proper to
take into consideration its purpose or object, the particular evils at which the legislation is aimed, or the
1nischief sought to be avoided. 50 An1. J ur., Statutes,
§§303 and 305.
Sec. 41-6-105, U.C.A., 1953, is part of our Motor
\-.-ehicle Act. It is taken from the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways. The obvious purpose of
this act is to protect the public safety. As said in
Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. A pp. 359, 77 N .E. 2d 537 :
"Our statute in relation to the regulation of
traffic is entitled ... a 'Uniform Act Regulating
'Traffic on Highways.' ... It is a comprehensive
act of which the quoted portion ... is a part. A
reading of the entire act leads to but one conclusion. It is designed in the main to protect the
public safety." (Emphasis ours.)
To the san1e effect see Ross v. Hartmn, 139 F. 2d 14.
The same principle was specifically recognized by
this court in treating a different section of the same
statute in North v. c·artwright, 119· Ut. 516, 229 P. 2d
871. See also 7 Am. Jur., 2d 795, Auton1obil<~ and Highway Traffic, §234 :
"A number of states have enacted statutes
prohibiting motorists frorn leaving a rnotor vehicle unattended without first stopping thP engine,
locking the ignition, and rernoving the kPy. Th<'
purpose of such a staute is twofold; it is a <l('t (' rrent to theft, and is also a safety device, for to
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lock the ignition and reinove the key results in
preventing interference with the vehicle's stationary condition and Inechanical immobility."
It is, of course, entirely proper to refer to the appelate decisions of other courts where a question of
statutory construction if of novel impression in the
forum, as in this case. "Indeed it is highly desirable
that a statute be given a similar interpretation by the
courts of the several states wherein it is in force." 50
Am. J ur. 315, Statutes, ~323. That canon of construction
has been dignified by codification. Sec. 41-6-174 U.C.A.
1953, provides as follows :
"!This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact
it." (Emphasis ours.)
Statutes identical to, or closely similar to the Utah
Statutes have not been construed by many appellate
courts. However, the few which have had occasion to
interpret the meaning of this language, have made the
interpretation which we urge in this case, namely, that
to "stand unattended" means in effect, that there is no
properly qualified person sufficiently close to, or having effective control of, the vehicle as to be able to
prevent it from escaping, either through mechanical
failure or through the interference of third persons.
See Hochschild, Kohn & Co., Inc. v. Candles, (Md.), 6,6
A. 2d 700, and other cases cited under Point II A of our
brief in case No. 9807.

All of the rules and canons of construction point
the sa1ne 'vay. They all indicate that the legislative
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intent was to protect the public fron1 runaway vehicles.
The accident which occurred here, is of the very type
which the statute "\vas enacted to prevent. Other courts
which have had occasion to pass on similar legislation
have so concluded. No sound reason has been advanced
·why this court should rule differently.
B.

VIOILATION OF SECTIOIN 41-6-105, U.C.A. 1953, IS
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

We wish to amplify our argument under P'oint II
B of our brief in Case No. 9807. Having established that
the conduct of the plaintiff was violative of the statute,
the only question which remains is whether the violation
of the statute was negligence per se. This court has
ruled in an unbroken line of authority that the violation
of an ordinance or statute designed for the safety of
life, limb and property, constitutes negligence per se.
In Smith v. Mine & Smelter Supply Co., 32 Utah 21,
88 P. 683, this court said :
"When a standard of duty or care is fixed
by law or ordinance, and such law or ordinance
has reference to the safety of life, li1nb, or property, then, as a matter of necessity, a violation
of such law or ordinance constitutes negligence.
***Care and prudence alone cannot e:rcuse. Exceeding or disregarding the standard of care
imposed must be held to be negligence, if it is
anything.'' (Emphasis ours.)
That doctrine was reaffir1ned in Skerl v. Willow
Creek Coal c·o., 92 Utah 474, 69 P.2d 502..
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That the doctrine applies to violation of statutes
and ordinances designed for the control of motor vehicle traffic was clearly established by North v. Cartwright, 119 Utah 516, 229 P.2d 871, where this court said:
"The statutes were promulgated for the
protection of the public and to safeguard prop~
erty, life and limb of persons using the highways
from accidents of the type here involved. Violation of these statutes then, constitutes negligence
in law. This doctrine of the law has been steadfastly adhered to by this court and generally in
other courts throughout the United States.***

"Plaintiff's violation of the statutory standard of care here involved, bars recovery if the
violation was a proximate contributing cause of
the injury." (Emphasis ours.)
See also 8 Am. Jur. 2d 393:
The cramping of the wheels against the
curb is sometimes required by statute, the violation of which has been held to be negligence
per se."
1

"

It is no ansvvrer to say that questions of negligence
and contributory negligence are generally for jury determination. While this is manifestly true where there
is a conflict in the evidence, no conflict exists here.
What occurred is established by the undisputed testimony of the plaintiff himself, by which he is bound.
There is neither a conflict in evidence to be resolved,
nor are there different inferences to be drawn from the
undisputed evidence. Neither is this an area where a
jury may say what a resaonable pe-rson would have done
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under the circumstances. ·The legislature has specifically
prescribed what all persons shall do under the circumstances here prevailing. Plaintiff clearly did not conform to the legislative standard. His failure to do so,
under the law of this jurisdiction, (which represents alInost universal law), is negligence as a matter of law,
barring his recovery in this case.
C.

PLAIN!TIFF'S NEGLIGENCE IN VI'OLATING THE
STAT'UTO·RY IMPOSED DUTY OF DUE CARE WAS
A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE AOCIDENT.

We have nothing to add to our argument under
Point II c·, and simply reaffirm and readopt the arguments set forth under Point II C of our original brief.

CO·NCL USION
The applicable Utah statute determines the standard of care to which plaintiff was required to adhere
in this case. By his own unequivocal admissions, he
failed to conform to the legislative mandate in several
different particulars. As a natural and proximate result
thereof, he was involved in an accident causing his
injury. 'The trial court correctly concluded that he was
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
and it follows that the judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

C'HRISTENSEN AND JE:N~SEN
By RAY R. CHRIS;TE.N·SEN
Attorneys for defendant
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